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The past twenty years have seen impressive advances in the comparative study of the
causes and patterns of genocide. Following World War II, most analyses of genocide
focused on the Holocaust. These earlier works presented us with sophisticated under-
standings of the historical, ideological, and structural origins of anti-Semitism, Nazi po-
licies, and the dynamics of mass violence that resulted in the genocide of Europe’s
Jewish and Roma and Sinti populations.2 In the years following 1945, however, there
were few comparative studies of genocide, and most of those were largely ignored by
social scientists.
Beginning with a number of pioneering works in the 1980s, and continuing
through the 1990s with the violence in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, scholars
turned their attention to the methods of comparative assessment. This “second genera-
tion” of comparative work continues to produce important insights into the conditions,
onset, and patterns of genocide.3 Scholars have widened their interests to explore the
relationships of imperialism and colonialism with modern genocide as well as the con-
nections linking environmental degradation and resource scarcity to mass killing.4
Some have called for a reinterpretation of Cold War state terror through the rubric of
genocide.5 And still other analysts are calling for a fundamental reframing of our basic
epistemological and ontological assumptions about genocide, drawing on critical theory,
post-structuralism, and other areas of political theory with provocative and important
results. The interdisciplinary ﬁeld of genocide studies is growing and becoming more
analytically sophisticated.6
Nevertheless, the ﬁeld faces some basic questions and challenges, including deﬁni-
tional disagreements that affect the scope and types of cases chosen; problematic
understandings of intentionality; and reductive conceptualizations of ideology and
rationality, among other issues.7 Given space constraints, here I focus on one speciﬁc
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issue requiring further attention: the relationship between genocide and other kinds of
political violence. How is genocide related temporally (in terms of sequencing) and spa-
tially to other kinds of violence? Although we have increasingly rich and sophisticated
empirical accounts of speciﬁc cases of genocide, our understanding of the theoretical
relationships between genocide and violence more generally is still under-developed.
This is especially evident in comparative causal theories, which focus largely on the
comparison of genocides and thus ignore connections between genocide and variations
of extreme violence, such as revolution, civil war, counterinsurgency strategy, and the
like.
This article does not provide an overview of the ﬁeld of comparative genocide stu-
dies.8 Instead, I examine the theoretical challenge of articulating genocide’s relationship
to political violence and sketch a few ways forward for the ﬁeld. These comments are
motivated by the belief that we should seek not only to understand the historical contin-
gencies of genocide in particular cases but also to develop theoretical knowledge of
mass political violence: the conditions under which it is likely to occur, the small-scale
processes (or, in Charles Tilly’s terms, “mechanisms”) of violent escalation and de-
escalation at local levels, and the ways in which these processes are shaped by, connect
to, reinforce, accelerate, and impede higher-level processes of violence.9 We should ex-
plain, in other words, variability in violent outcomes. With a few exceptions, our com-
parative theories have yet to develop systematic theoretical accounts for the interactions
of these various levels of violence (micro, meso, macro) and consequently the onset
and diffusion of genocidal violence; nor do they investigate cases where genocide did
not occur.
The points below are primarily aimed at comparative works on the causes of geno-
cide—a topic that continues to receive an enormous amount of attention from scholars.
The comments are largely methodological in nature and are thus a few degrees removed
from the deeper epistemological and ontological debates currently raging in our ﬁeld.
Nevertheless, these methodological issues require attention if our knowledge of this ter-
rible phenomenon is to deepen.
Genocide and Political Violence
It is by now well established that genocide and war often go hand in hand. Numerous
studies have shown that genocides tend to occur during wars, when populations are liv-
ing under conditions of fear and are de-sensitized to the use of mass violence, when in-
group and out-group distinctions are pronounced, when the elite are likely to choose
more radical strategies to achieve their aims, and when state resources are already mobi-
lized for the killing of enemies and the repression of internal dissent.10 Nevertheless,
comparative research on the causes of genocide has generally been remarkably uninter-
ested in exploring how genocide is situated in the wider constellation of political vio-
lence. Instead, studies have largely focused on cases in which the outcome has been
genocide. To be clear, I am not arguing that scholars have failed to explore antecedent
factors or that they have only studied speciﬁc genocidal periods (say Armenia 1915–
1923, Cambodia 1975–1979, etc.). Indeed, most of the comparative literature in the ﬁeld
draws on a wide variety of background conditions to explain genocide, from historical
and structural factors (state formation, regime types, political culture, histories of exclu-
sion going back decades or more, and the like) to more immediate factors, such as polit-
ical crises and the strategic choices of the elite. Rather, the problem has been that cases
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are chosen for analysis based on the experience of genocide, while other instances with
similar prior conditions and different violent outcomes are mostly ignored.
The narrow focus of research on cases of genocide (or selection on the dependent
variable) carries some signiﬁcant methodological problems. By studying only those
cases which have resulted in genocide, how do we know whether our proposed factors,
causal dynamics, and processes actually explain genocide? It may be that these same
factors explain other forms of violence as well and that we are consequently misidentify-
ing the true fundamental and distinct causes of genocide. The problem is that in study-
ing only genocides we likely choose only those cases that conﬁrm our theoretical
assumptions at the expense of discovering whether our stipulated causal mechanisms
are indeed primary causal factors. Take, for instance, the examination of only highly
ideological genocides. Bounded in this way, one’s ﬁndings are likely to show that radical
ideologies are a primary cause of genocide (which itself risks being tautological), while
failing to explain how these ideologies may be present in less violent outcomes or not
present in other cases sharing many of the empirical features of genocide.11 If radical
ideologies also appear in non-genocidal violence, then we need to re-examine the causal
importance of ideology to genocide. And yet without investigating cases with broadly
similar prior conditions but different violent outcomes, it is difﬁcult to gauge the impor-
tance of ideology (or any other factor).
There are several possible ways forward. First, scholars should broaden the types of
violence they study and thus situate genocide more thoroughly within the literature of
political violence. Rather than ask, “What do all genocides have in common?” (a ques-
tion, incidentally, made all the more difﬁcult given the lack of consensus in the ﬁeld on
the deﬁnition of genocide12), we should explore the conditions that lead to extreme
forms of political violence—of which genocide is a subset—as well as examine the ways
in which genocide and other forms of political violence interact and reinforce one
another. To do this, the ﬁeld needs to engage with advances in other research areas on
political violence, such as civil war and non-genocidal state repression. Second, compar-
ative genocide scholars should look to the expanding microanalysis work on violence
(such as research on civil wars) as a way of better understanding the dissemination,
intensity, and patterns of violence within cases. In sum, the comparative study of geno-
cide needs to engage the broader domain of conﬂict studies.
Genocide and Political Violence: Expanding the Research Frame
I am advocating a change in theoretical perspective to situate genocide within the larger
context of political violence instead of focusing solely on the study of genocide. I do not
claim that we should abandon single-case or comparative studies of genocide tout court,
since these methods have developed important theoretical and practical knowledge.
Rather, I envision this contextual turn (and broadening) as a complement to the “geno-
cide only” approaches still dominating our ﬁeld. This alternative contextual approach
has, I believe, several beneﬁts: it would draw attention to the broader host of perpetrator
repressive and destructive policies (beyond those leading to genocide), show the interac-
tive effects and general processes of perpetrator policy radicalization, and shed light on
the different steps in the continuum of repression. In addition, by extending our
research to cover instances of non-genocidal mass violence we could explore why geno-
cide does not occur in certain cases and why, in other scenarios, violence might remain
constant, without degenerating into intentional extermination. Extant comparative
literature in genocide studies does not adequately account for either possibility.13
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Without wider research into cases of political violence we risk producing causal theories
that either misrepresent the causes of genocide or over-determine outcomes. In other
words, we cannot understand why political violence escalates, remains constant, or
declines.
The state repression literature may be helpful here.14 Scholars across disciplines
have explored when and how repressive behavior increases and decreases.15 The ques-
tions that arise from these lines of inquiry are widely varied, but they are meant to
encapsulate a broad range of violent behavior beyond genocide alone. For instance, re-
searchers ask, Under what conditions do states move from institutional coercive prac-
tices, such as legalized civil and political discrimination or language restrictions, to
wider forms of collective suppression, such as total language and religious prohibitions?
When do occasional riots turn into sustained attacks and when do they not? Why do
targeted forced displacements become large-scale, violent deportations in some cases
and not in others? And why do some states settle on forced conversion or the removal
of target populations, while others choose extermination? The state repression literature
includes a variety of methodological approaches, but it generally shares a commitment
to exploring the emergence, sustainment, decline, and variation of repression and violence
in a multiplicity of forms and over time.16 In addition, much of the best repression litera-
ture is interactive in approach17; it investigates how interactions between the state and
non-state actors (armed and unarmed) alter the political landscape, in some cases esca-
lating violence and in others lessening the probability of conﬂict. Contextualizing geno-
cide research within the broader domain of political violence can provide us with
theoretical purchase on change and variability in violent outcomes. With some impor-
tant exceptions, works in our ﬁeld fail to draw general theoretical insights about radica-
lization from case-speciﬁc historical contingencies.18 Given that so little comparative
genocide research embeds its analytical framework within broader explanatory models
of political violence, it is perhaps unsurprising that genocide seems over-determined:
the frameworks provide few theoretical resources for understanding the escalation
and de-escalation of violence. Anchoring our causal theories within the political vio-
lence literature may allow us to theorize more broadly about the dynamics of escalation
and de-escalation.
Microanalysis of Genocide
We should also pursue more microanalyses to explain the dissemination and intensity
of violence within cases (a point relevant to genocide studies and the study of political
violence more generally). Country-level studies are still prevalent in comparative geno-
cide research. Vahakn Dadrian, Leo Kuper, and Richard Hovannisian produced classic
works focusing on the role of pre-existing cleavages in society, and Irving L. Horowitz,
Rudolph Rummel, and Hannah Arendt drew attention to regime type and state power
to explain genocide.19 More recently, Barbara Harff has analyzed the destabilizing ef-
fects of national political crises and Benjamin Valentino has focused on the interests
and goals of national elites.20 Michael Mann has traced the process of elite and follower
radicalization against a background of utopic ideologies and the rise of modern mass
democracy.21 Nevertheless, outside of anthropological and historical studies,22 there is
still relatively little work that systematically explains internal differences across space
and time. Genocide is understood as an aggregate outcome of country-level factors,
while variation within states and regions is ignored. This can lead to an overrepresenta-
tion of the role of national elites and macro-level state failure and the employment of
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static and reiﬁed conceptions like “masses” and “ethnicity” at the expense of under-
standing sub-national and local dynamics and patterns of violence (and non-violence).
We should complement and deepen these macro-level studies by investigating spa-
tial and temporal variations within case studies (countries or regions, such as the Great
Lakes region). Doing so could provide us with a better understanding of why genocidal
violence occurs in some places prior to others, and what the micro- or meso-causal pro-
cesses that affect internal variation might be. Current research on civil war has taken
this microanalytical turn and made important ﬁndings. The ﬁeld of genocide studies
could draw from these methodological advances to great effect.23
A host of questions are open to microanalytic research on genocide, such as:
(1) How is identity articulated and acted upon in particular circumstances? We know
from careful ethnographic research that master ideological narratives articulated by
elites (ethnic, political, regional, religious, or other) frequently have complex and rather
indirect relations to violence in situ.24 Skin color, height, or facial features may operate
as reductive phenotypal indicators in ofﬁcial discourse, but they might also be inter-
preted in a variety of ways depending on local attitudes. Accent or linguistic compe-
tence may serve as a relevant signiﬁer in other instances, but here, too, perpetrators
often interpret identity in myriad ways. More tangential markers, such as clothing,
occupation, or neighborhood of residence may function as proxies for primary identity.
And of course, when victim groups are displaced and ﬂeeing, interpretations may
become looser and more encompassing to ensure that no potential “enemies” escape.
(2) What is the role of geography in the onset and diffusion of violence? Geography
plays an important role in our understanding of the Armenian resistance in Musa
Dagh, and, elsewhere, in the abilities of Tutsi and Hutu to evade murder and the
Khmer Rouge’s unstable control over various national zones. Yet we still have no
sophisticated explanation for the role of geography in genocide as such.25 Finally,
(3) consider state power (or capacity), frequently put forth as central to explaining geno-
cide. Rudolph Rummel noted crisply, “Power kills; absolute power kills absolutely.”26
However, measuring state power at the national level—as Rummel does—provides little
insight into when genocide is likely to occur or how it may spread.27 States may have
uneven control over their territory given coercive and intelligence gathering capacities,
which may explain why in some places violence is highly targeted, while in others it is
wild and all-encompassing. Greater sensitivity to state coercive capacity across space
and time, as well as the use of local allies and proxies, could provide us with more
nuanced understandings of repression and mass killings.
Of course, some genocide scholars are already moving in this direction with sophis-
ticated ideographic studies on the Ottoman Empire, Cambodia, and Rwanda.28 How-
ever, comparative research has not integrated their methodological perspectives. Studies
on the Holocaust are furthest along in this area—unsurprising given the attention it has
received for 60 years—but we need more of this type of analysis to enrich our compara-
tive theories. Particularly in the context of war, in which genocide is most likely to
occur, violence is multidirectional and includes a host of armed and unarmed actors,
with variations in level, organization, and types of violence across space and time.29 We
need a better theoretical understanding of these dynamics.
Micro-level analysis strengthens comparative research in at least three ways. First,
as Scott Straus has noted, it increases the number of observations available for study, al-
lowing for more nuanced understandings of violent dynamics than those found in
Genocide and Political Violence 85
© 2012 Genocide Studies and Prevention 7, no. 1 doi:10.3138/gsp.7.1.81
macro-level studies.30 Second, it de-centers our general descriptions of violent phenom-
ena. Greater sensitivity to local variation forces scholars to rethink how master narra-
tives may (or may not) connect to local violence and thus problematizes analytical
categorizations such as race and ethnicity. Finally, a microanalytical approach chal-
lenges the standard beginnings and endpoints of violent phenomena, such as genocide,
and instead highlights the continuity and discontinuity of violence before and after
event-deﬁning dates, thereby avoiding their arbitrary (and often rather neat) truncation.
Clearly, there are challenges to employing micro-level analyses. Genocide requires
elite commitment, complex logistical coordination, and the work of specialized killers;
it does not erupt spontaneously and randomly in communities, but is instead rooted in
broader political, institutional, and social contexts. Macro comparative frameworks
help us assess whether (and how) particular dynamics of violence ﬁt wider patterns
and to what extent we can generalize across cases. But the point here is not to replace
higher-level analysis with microanalysis. Rather, micro approaches can complement
macroanalyses by providing us with more nuanced accounts of the onset and patterns
of genocide, consequently forcing us to rethink our broader analytical frameworks. A
clearer understanding of local processes and circumstances, and the way in which these
interact with meso- and macro-scale phenomena, could help us avoid generalizing
causal theories that ignore real and important local differences.31
Conclusion
This article has identiﬁed a particular problem for genocide studies, namely the under-
emphasis of systematic investigation into the relation between genocide and other
forms of political violence, and the ways in which they are related temporally (in terms
of sequencing) and spatially. There is not necessarily one way to ﬁll this research need,
and the use of state repression literature in political science and sociology introduced
here is only one possible way forward. Contemporary microanalytical advances in the
civil war literature can also serve as an illustration of how to disaggregate analyses in
such a way that more general theoretical insights can continue to be generated. Clearly,
the ﬁeld of genocide studies is both inter- and multidisciplinary, and it would be short-
sighted to advocate for a single methodological answer to the problems raised here.
Nevertheless, scholars need to engage these problems if we are to advance our under-
standing of these dimensions of genocide.
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